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Emotion regulation is important for psychological well-being. Although it is known that
alternative regulation strategies may have different emotional consequences, the effec-
tiveness of such strategies for socially driven emotions remains unclear. In this study we
investigated the efficacy of different forms of reappraisal on responses to the selfish and
altruistic behavior of others in the Dictator Game. In Experiment 1, subjects mentalized the
intentions of the other player in one condition, and took distance from the situation in the
other. Emotion ratings were recorded after each offer. Compared with a baseline condition,
mentalizing led subjects to experience their emotions more positively when receiving both
selfish and altruistic proposals, whereas distancing decreased the valence when receiv-
ing altruistic offers, but did not affect the perception of selfish behavior. In Experiment 2,
subjects played with both computer and human partners while reappraising the meaning
of the player’s intentions (with a human partner) or the meaning of the situation (with a
computer partner). Results showed that both contexts were effectively modulated by reap-
praisal, however a stronger effect was observed when the donor was a human partner, as
compared to a computer partner. Taken together, these results demonstrate that socially
driven emotions can be successfully modulated by reappraisal strategies that focus on the
reinterpretation of others’ intentions.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent experimental evidence suggests that emotion regulation
strategies play a key role in helping individuals to adapt to and
master social interactions (Gross, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2002; Gross
and John, 2003). Indeed, our ability to regulate emotions when
interacting with others is considered to be a crucial dimension of
both emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Lopes et al.,
2011), and good mental health (Gross, 2002). Broadly speaking,
emotion regulation refers to a set of processes by which “individ-
uals influence which emotions they have, when they have them,
and how they experience and express these emotions” (cf. Gross,
1999). Previous studies have examined the processes that individ-
uals use to influence the emotions they generate, when they do
so, and how these emotions are experienced or expressed (Gross,
1998). Despite the extensive literature on emotion“self regulation,”
which focuses primarily on the regulation of basic emotions such
as fear and disgust in relation to visual stimuli (see Ochsner and
Gross, 2005), evidence of emotion regulation in social interactive
situations is still poorly understood. An important experimental
question is whether emotion regulation can be applied to social
interactive contexts, and in particular whether the same regula-
tory strategies that are useful in self regulation can also be applied
in interpersonal situations. This information may provide deeper
understanding of psychiatric disorders characterized by serious
disturbances in social functioning such as borderline personality
disorder (Gunderson, 2007), avoidant personality disorder (Leis-
ing et al., 2006), or schizotypic spectrum disorders (Ballon et al.,
2007).
These socially driven emotions have been recently explored by
asking about the emotional regulation of subjects when look-
ing at pictures depicting social scenes (Koenigsberg et al., 2011;
Vrtickaa et al., 2011). While the methodology was similar to the
“standard”studies, here the researchers employed a subset of Inter-
national Affective Pictures depicting scenes with social features
(e.g., people in situations of abuse, aggression. . .) rather than
general emotional pictures. Participants were asked to reappraise
emotions elicited by these social scenarios, but importantly they
were not exposed to the actual emotions which stem from real
social situations. Studying the regulation of actual social situations
is particularly important given the failure to regulate interpersonal
responses often seen in clinical disorders (Phillips et al., 2003;
Ochsner and Gross, 2008).
To study real interactive situations, one popular approach has
been to examine emotion regulation strategies applied to tasks
derived from Game Theory. Game theory explores situations
of conflict and cooperation between decision-makers (Myerson,
1997), offers well-specified models for the investigation of social
exchange (Sanfey and Dorris, 2009), and can assess how social
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factors such as reciprocity, equity, and bargaining can affect our
emotions and subsequent decisions. Several studies have used
game theoretic approaches to study emotion regulation in inter-
active contexts (e.g., van’tWout et al., 2010). In one other example,
Grecucci et al. (2012) asked subjects to reappraise their emotions
when interacting with a partner who was making fair or unfair
monetary offers, utilizing the classic Ultimatum Game task (Guth
et al., 1982). Here, subjects’ decisions were strongly modulated
by the reappraisal strategy used, with fewer rejections of unfair
offers when down-regulating emotions and increased rejections
when up-regulating emotions. Using fMRI demonstrated that this
affective modulation was correlated with activity in the insula,
a brain region previously shown to be involved in the aversive
reactions elicited by unfair offers (Sanfey et al., 2003). Specifi-
cally, the posterior part of the insula showed a similar pattern of
activation as was observed behaviorally (less activity for down-
regulation and more for up-regulation, as compared to a neutral
baseline).
Here, we aim to extend the above study by testing how social
norms (such as fairness, equality, and prosocial behavior), and in
particular their violations, affect our emotional reactions in an
interactive context. The Grecucci et al. (2012) study showed that
emotion regulation can successfully modulate economic decision-
making, but an open question is what emotions are actually
being regulated? In the present study we use the Dictator Game
with participants in the role of receiver in order to explore how
we react emotionally to social norms, both when these norms
are and are not violated. The Dictator Game (Kahneman et al.,
1986) involves two players, one of whom is asked to divide up
a specified sum of money (usually C10 or the equivalent). The
first player (Allocator) is free to make any possible division of
this amount, and the second player (Recipient) simply receives
whatever is proffered by the Allocator. Importantly therefore, the
emotional reactions of the Recipient take place in the absence of
any decision. Theories on social preference argue that people dis-
play “inequity aversion” (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) when exposed
to unfair divisions of money, as are often demonstrated in the
Dictator Game when the Allocator keeps more money than he/she
gives away. Even though there is no commonly agreed standard for
what constitutes “fair” behavior (Cornelissen et al., 2011), people
expect others to balance self-interest with prosocial tendencies,
resulting in approximately fair divisions. But what if our part-
ners violate such expectations? Do we feel disappointed in such
behaviors? Do we get angry at them? And more importantly, are
emotion regulation strategies effective in modulating such com-
plex socially induced emotions? These questions will be addressed
in this study.
A further issue to examine here is whether different strategies
have similar effects on the regulation of socially driven emotions.
Of the set of strategies studied in the experimental literature of
self regulation, the most well-characterized is that of reappraisal.
This strategy involves reinterpreting the meaning of a stimulus
in order to change one’s emotional response to it (Gross, 1999),
with subjects typically asked to build an interpretation of the
emotional stimulus in such a way as to decrease their emotional
response. Behavioral studies have shown that reappraisal is one
of the most flexible, adaptive, and commonly employed strategies
for regulating negative emotional responses (Gross, 2002). Impor-
tantly, this strategy has been linked to the maintenance of well-
being (Gross and John, 2003), and a recent study from our group
(Grecucci et al., 2012) showed that this strategy is also effective
in modulating social decision-making (in the context of Ultima-
tum Game behavior). In particular, we showed that reappraisal of
the intentions of the other player, or mentalizing-reappraisal, was
effective in changing interpersonal reactions (punishment behav-
iors) toward unfair behaviors. Making sense of social interactions
requires inferring intentions, beliefs, and desires (i.e., mentaliz-
ing; see Frith et al., 1991; Frith and Frith, 2003), and this concurs
with a recent study that demonstrated mentalizing abilities at work
when making value-based decisions (Evans et al., 2011). Impor-
tantly, mentalizing has an effect of regulating our emotions (Sharp
et al., 2011). The question here then is if this version of reap-
praisal can regulate socially driven emotions in the absence of a
decision. Though there are also other strategies that people often
use when facing emotion-eliciting situations, not all strategies are
equally effective in producing healthy emotion regulation. For
example, “emotional suppression,” a strategy by which individ-
uals suppress every expression of the ongoing emotion by limiting
awareness of the emotional experience (Gross, 2002), can result in
diminished control of emotion, interpersonal functioning, mem-
ory, well-being, and greater depressive symptomatology (Gross
and John, 2003). Another strategy that, although perhaps effec-
tive in the short-term, may be detrimental in social-interpersonal
contexts is “distancing,” whereby subjects detach themselves from
feelings and behave as neutral observers. Distancing has proven
to be effective in reducing self-reported simple negative emotions
(Gross, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004; Kalisch et al., 2005; Eippert
et al., 2007). However, distancing may also reduce positive emo-
tions (Beauregard et al., 2001; Kim and Hamann, 2007), leading
subjects to flatten their emotional reactivity in a maladaptive way,
in a similar way to schizoid or avoidant personality disorders (Leis-
ing et al., 2006). Even if there is some evidence that distancing can
be an effective strategy in modulating emotions when looking at
emotional pictures (Kalisch et al., 2005; Koenigsberg et al., 2011),
it may not be useful or healthy when interacting directly with peo-
ple. Suppression is a qualitatively different strategy, as it focuses
on the “expression of emotions” (Gross, 2002), whereas both men-
talizing and distancing are strategies focused on “reappraising”
the events when the emotion is generated but not yet expressed.
Both mentalizing and distancing can be defined as interpersonal
strategies that “focus on the other,” whereas suppression is a more
self-focused strategy. For these reasons we selected distancing as a
control strategy for one of particular interest, mentalizing.
A final unresolved issue is whether emotion regulation acts
upon valence, upon arousal, or on both, and more importantly,
if arousal can be decreased or increased according to the valence
of the experienced emotion. The vast majority of previous studies
(Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004) have used simple emotional ratings
regarding the pleasantness of the experienced emotion, without
trying to separate these two relevant dimensions according to cur-
rent theories of emotion (Lang and Bradley, 2010). The particular
task used in the present study will permit us to explore these
issues by using a continuum of offers that may elicit emotions
from unpleasant to pleasant, tested for both their valence and
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arousal effects. We predict that if the strategy is able to increase
the valence (e.g., increasing positivity), arousal will be increased
as well, making subjects experience a positive emotion at its most
vivid. However, in case of a decrease of valence (when negative
emotion is experienced), arousal should decrease to prevent a
painful experience of the emotion itself. Therefore, in the present
study we will first test the notion that interpersonal emotion reg-
ulation is possible. While previous studies used only pictures of
social scenes (Koenigsberg et al., 2011), emotions elicited in real
social interactions may well be of a qualitatively different nature
than those experienced while watching unpleasant images. We
have previously explored social interactive emotions elicited by
the Ultimatum Game (Grecucci et al., 2012), however the effect of
emotion regulation was indirectly assessed by the effect produced
on socioeconomic decisions (“regulated decisions”) and not on the
emotions elicited themselves. Here, we will use the Dictator Game
to elicit pleasant and unpleasant social emotions, without giving
players the possibility to punish the proposers’ unfair behavior. We
predict an effect of emotion regulation on both the valence and
arousal of the experienced emotions as compared to a baseline
condition.
Secondly, we examine whether different strategies are equally
effective in promoting emotion regulation. Therefore, we will
test two different emotion regulation strategies: mind-of-another-
reappraisal, or mentalizing, and distancing. We predict a positive
effect of the mentalizing strategy on emotional ratings for which
the valence becomes less unpleasant, whereas we expect that dis-
tancing is not effective in decreasing the unpleasantness of negative
emotions. An additional hypothesis is that distancing will also have
an effect of flattening emotional reactivity more generally. These
first two aims are tested in Experiment 1.
Thirdly, we will test whether emotion regulation when interact-
ing with a human partner is different when interacting with a non-
human partner. In both contexts the strategy is the same, applied to
monetary offers from both human and computer donors respec-
tively. We expect that interpersonal emotion regulation is superior
when reappraising the emotions elicited from a human as opposed
to a non-human partner due to the “mentalistic” nature of the
strategy used. If this is the case, this will be further confirmation
of the importance of interpersonal abilities on emotion regulation
of socially driven emotions, as predicted by theory (Fonagy, 2006).
This aim will be tested in Experiment 2.
Fourthly, across both experiments we will examine both arousal
and valence dimensions, examining differences in how alterna-
tive emotion regulation strategies (Experiment 1) and alternative
contexts (Experiment 2) can affect our emotional experience.
Previous experiments did not make a clear distinction between
valence and arousal effects of emotion regulation. In addition to
the effect of strategy on the perceived valence we also expect an
effect on arousal, as it is an important dimension of the emo-
tional experience. In particular, we predict different effects on
valence and arousal according to the specific strategy used. As
mentalizing involves the reinterpretation of the event, we expect
a strong change on the perceived valence, but less on arousal. On
the contrary, as distancing is more focused on putting oneself in
a detached perspective, here we expect a stronger effect on the
arousal dimension, and less on valence, as no cognitive operation
is required for the evaluation of the event.
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment will examine the effect of regulation on socially
driven emotions by employing two strategies, those of mentalizing
and distancing.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two participants (11 males) from the local area partic-
ipated in the study, with a mean age of 23.95 (SD± 1.43) years.
The local ethics committee approved the study and all participants
provided written informed consent after the procedures had been
fully explained.
Dictator game
After providing informed consent, participants were first
instructed as to the nature and rules of the Dictator Game. Partic-
ipants were told that they would play this game as recipient with a
different player in the role of the allocator on each trial. Sixty tri-
als were presented, though participants were not informed of the
total number of rounds in advance. Each round involved receiving
a proposal concerning a 10C amount. The offers included four rep-
etitions of five possible offers (1C, 2C, 3C, 4C, and 5C out of 10C),
for a total of 20 offers for each of the three conditions (look, men-
talizing, and distancing). The emotion regulation conditions were
blocked and counterbalanced across participants. This was done to
prevent any substantial task switching and carry over effects from
one strategy to another. The offer types and pictures of Allocators
were completely randomized inside each block. The task instruc-
tions emphasized that the different partners in the game would
play the game independently of each other, and participants were
led to believe the offers were previously recorded from real part-
ners. Participants played the game using a computerized version
of the task. The timeline of each run involved the presentation of
a fixation point for 500 ms, then the instruction of the regulation
strategy to be applied appeared for 2000 ms, followed by the face
of the proposer and the proposal itself for 8000 ms, leaving the
time to apply the strategy. After this, they were asked to rate their
emotions separately on two scales (one for arousal and one for
valence) using a visual analog scale known as the Self Assessment
Manikin (Lang, 1994). No time constraints were given for these
two events, and participants were told they would be paid a per-
centage of what they received during the game. See Figure 1 for a
timeline.
Emotion regulation instructions
Before beginning the game, participants were instructed that they
would have to use specific cognitive strategies upon the receipt
of an offer. A written protocol describing each of the two strate-
gies was provided. Following Gross (1998), a general reappraisal
definition was given as “interpreting potentially emotion-relevant
stimuli in unemotional terms,” in particular to make them less
negative. An example was presented showing a picture depicting a
crying woman. Participants were told that the way they interpret
an event will affect the way they feel. For example, if they think
that the woman is in great pain because she is mourning a loved
one’s death they may feel upset, but if they think that the woman
is merely tired or suffering from a headache they may feel less dis-
tressed by that event. After this example, participants were told to
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FIGURE 1 | A timeline of the events presented on each trial. Subjects’
responses on valence and arousal ratings were recorded.
make an effort to reinterpret the event as less negative. They were
then given the instructions of the Dictator Game and told they had
to translate this strategy into the context of this game. To apply
reappraisal to the Game they were asked to focus on the mind of
the Allocator in order to build an interpretation of the intentions
behind players’ behavior. This reinterpretation of their intentions
was meant to be less negative. Some examples were given (“he is
not that stingy, probably does not have so much money to give me,”
“this is the best he can do” etc.). We define this kind of reappraisal
focused on others’ minds as “mentalizing,” in other words an effort
of generating possible explanations of the intentions of others.
For the other strategy, distancing, they were told that how
involved they feel in a situation will affect their perceived distress.
A picture was then presented depicting a bloody fight between
police and terrorists, and they were told that if they feel them-
selves affected by this situation they probably will feel scared and
worried, whereas if they think that that situation is far from their
lives and not connected at all with them, they will feel quite neutral
in relation to that event. After this, subjects were told how to apply
this strategy to the context of DG. Some examples were given, such
as (“this proposal won’t affect me,”“I don’t care”).
Importantly, distancing was meant to be an avoidance-based
strategy, meaning that subject had to put themselves in a detached
perspective, whereas mentalizing was meant to be an effort of con-
nection with the others. Finally, for the“look”condition, they were
to simply allow themselves to respond naturally, without any effort
of interpretation.
Before beginning the first block of DG, we verified that partic-
ipants understood the respective emotion regulation instructions
by asking each to verbalize what they would do when confronted
with different offers. A practice session proceeded every block.
Questionnaires
At the conclusion of the experiment,participants were asked to rate
their emotional state on a 9-point Likert scale when they received
the prototypical example of a very unfair offer (1C out of 10C),and
fair (5C out of 10C). Moreover, effectiveness of change of emo-
tional responses for both strategies was rated again on a 9-point
Likert scale. Thinking strategies adopted during the experiment
were also recorded for both strategies. This was done to ensure
that participants understood the instructions and then applied
them in a coherent manner according to the training instructions.
RESULTS
Emotion ratings in the dictator game
We first examined if the affective ratings were different across the
emotion regulation and baseline conditions. We computed two
separate ANOVAs, one for valence and one for arousal, each with
Strategies (mentalizing vs. distancing vs. look), and Offers (1C, 2C,
3C, 4C, and 5C) as factors. Analysis on valence returned a signif-
icant main effect of Strategy [F(2, 42)= 41.309, p < 0.0001], and
of Offers [F(4, 84)= 101.513, p < 0.0001], as well as a significant
interaction [F(8, 168)= 5.817, p < 0.0001]. Next, Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc tests with participants’ subjective ratings as
dependent variables were computed, comparing each strategy for
every offer. Three comparisons were significant for mentalizing
as compared with look: for C1: (p < 0.05), diff: −2, 45; for C2:
(p < 0.05), diff:−2, 17; for C3: (p < 0.05), diff:−1, 55; suggesting
that mentalizing decreased the unpleasantness of the unfair offers
(C1, C2, and C3). One comparison was significant for distancing
as compared with look C5: (p < 0.05), diff: 1.07, suggesting that
distancing decreased the valence of the most fair offer (e.g., per-
ceived as less positive). The differences between mentalizing and
distancing were all significant (all p < 0.05; see Figure 2).
Then, we computed ANOVA on arousal ratings. This returned
a significant main effect of Strategy [F(2, 42)= 5.810, p < 0.01],
and of Offer [F(4, 84)= 7.203, p < 0.0001]. However, the interac-
tion failed to reach significance [F(8, 168)= 1.376, p= 0.21]. No
further analyses were run on arousal ratings. See Figure 2.
To further explore the effect produced by each strategy, we
computed the effect size of each strategy, calculated as the dif-
ference between the strategy and the baseline look condition,
collapsing for all offers. In terms of valence, the mentalizing strat-
egy returned a strong effect of 1.51 points toward more positive
perception of the interaction with the partner, whereas distanc-
ing was less effective, producing a small effect of −0.19 in the
direction of perceiving the events as less positive. In terms of
arousal, the mentalizing produced an effect of 0.8 points in the
direction of perceiving the emotions as more vivid, whereas the
distancing strategy returned an effect of −0.51 points toward a
more blunted perception of emotion. As expected, mentalizing
had a stronger effect on valence as compared to distancing. When
considering arousal, both strategies were effective in altering the
ratings, however, they acted in opposite directions. Mentalizing
increased arousal, whereas distancing decreased it. See Figure 2
and Table 1.
Questionnaires
Emotional ratings when receiving both very fair (C5) and very
unfair (C1) offers were entered into an ANOVA for each of
the six emotions inquired about (anger, disgust, surprise, sad-
ness, happiness, and disappointment). Analysis returned a sig-
nificant main effect of offer [F(2, 21)= 28.487, p < 0.0001], and
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 616 | 4
Grecucci et al. Interpersonal emotion regulation
FIGURE 2 | Results from Experiment 1 are presented. (Upper part) Valence
(graph on the left) of emotions associated with both altruistic and selfish
behaviors is increased when subjects mentalized the intentions of players,
but not when they took the distance from them. Arousal (graph on the right)
was affected by strategies. (Lower part) Results from size effects of valence
and arousal are shown. See text for further information.
of emotion [F(5, 105)= 9.071, p < 0.0001], as well as a signif-
icant interaction [F(5, 105)= 50.349, p < 0.0001]. Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc tests were then computed with participants’
subjective ratings as dependent variables, comparing for each
emotion and every offer. For the unfair offer, the strongest emo-
tion elicited was disappointment (score: 6.28), followed by anger
(5.45), sadness (5.09), disgust (5.04), surprise (4.54), and happi-
ness (2.22). Disappointment, anger, disgust, sadness, and surprise
differed from happiness (p < 0.05), though not from each other
(p > 0.05).
For the fair offer, the strongest emotion elicited was happiness
(7.09), followed by surprise (5.9) disgust (1.77), sadness (1.72),dis-
appointment (1.5), and anger (1.45). Happiness and surprise dif-
fered from all other emotions (p < 0.05), but not from each other.
When comparing between fairness levels, the emotions of anger,
disgust, happiness, sadness, and disappointment significantly
differed (p < 0.05), whereas surprise did not (p > 0.05).
We can therefore conclude that the main emotions elicited
by the interpersonal context of the Dictator Game when treated
unfairly was primarily disappointment, with disgust, sadness, and
anger invoked to a lesser extent. These emotions may be the ones
regulated during the strategy of mentalizing. We can also conclude
that the main emotion elicited by fair treatment was mainly hap-
piness, but also surprise was invoked by the altruistic behavior. See
Figures 3A,B and Table 1.
After the experiment, participants were also asked to evalu-
ate on a 9-point Likert scale how much they felt their emotions
changed as a function of the two emotion regulation strategies.
In the mentalizing condition they rated their emotion change
with strength of 5.54 (SD± 2.17) when confronted with selfish
behavior, and 5.41 (SD± 2.30) when confronted with altruistic
behavior. In the distancing condition they felt their emotions
changed with a strength of 4.59 (SD± 2.30) when confronted with
selfish behavior, and 4.22 (SD± 2.24) when confronted with altru-
istic behavior. Emotional ratings when applying the two strategies
to both fair (C5) and unfair (C1) offers entered an ANOVA. Analy-
sis returned a significant main effect of strategy [F(1, 21)= 6.34,
p < 0.05], however the effect of offer failed to reach significance
[F(1, 21)= 0.245, p= 0.626], as well as the interaction [F(1,
21)= 0.122, p= 0.731]. Importantly, the mentalizing strategy had
a significantly stronger effect as compared with distancing for
altruistic behavior [t (1, 21)=−2.5, p < 0.05], but failed to reach
significance for selfish behavior [t (1, 21)=−1.617, p= 0.121]. See
Figure 3C.
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Table 1 | Experiment 1: results from the experiment and from the
questionnaires.
Experiment ratings
Regulation of valence
Look Mentalizing Distancing
C1 2.27 (1.19) 4.72 (1.75)* 2.92 (1.51)
C2 3.04 (1.29) 5.21 (1.58)* 3.29 (1.38)
C3 3.81 (1.37) 5.37 (1.60)* 3.75 (1.27)
C4 5.45 (1.77) 6.22 (1.72) 4.72 (1.49)
C5 6.76 (2.15) 7.35 (1.94) 5.68 (1.70)*
Effect size of valence +1.51* −0.19*
Regulation of arousal
Look Mentalizing Distancing
C1 4.89 (2.48) 5.78 (1.98) 4.70 (2.78)
C2 4.72 (2.12) 5.57 (1.84) 4.25 (2.23)
C3 4.71 (1.89) 5.54 (1.75) 4.21 (1.99)
C4 5.30 (2.01) 5.96 (1.97) 4.43 (2.08)
C5 6.02 (2.31) 6.38 (2.11) 4.82 (2.22)
Effect size of arousal +0.8* −0.51*
Questionnaires
1C Offer 5C Offer
Anger 5.45 (2.80) Anger 1.45 (0.91)
Disgust 5.04 (2.53) Disgust 1.77 (1.19)
Surprise 4.54 (2.38) Surprise 5.90 (2.18)**
Happiness 2.22 (1.65)** Happiness 7.09 (1.63)**
Sadness 5.09 (2.58) Sadness 1.72 (1.24)
Disappointment 6.27 (2.31) Disappointment 1.5 (0.74)
*Indicates a significant difference.
**Indicates a significant difference from the other emotions inside every offer.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this first experiment was twofold. Firstly, we wanted to
test whether emotion regulation can be applied in an interpersonal
context to complex social emotions,as opposed to the simple visual
stimuli used in previous studies. Secondly, we examined whether
two different emotion regulation strategies, mentalizing and dis-
tancing, can affect emotion perception in an interactive context in
which people observed selfish and altruistic behavior regarding the
splitting of a pot of money. Our data demonstrate that interper-
sonal emotion regulation is possible, and indeed strongly affects
our perception of both selfish and altruistic behaviors. Impor-
tantly, mentalizing (e.g., reinterpretation of the intentions of the
players in a way to make them less negative) increased the valence
(more positive) of selfish economic offers (in the range of C1–
C3 out of 10). Conversely, distancing (e.g., considering events
with a detached perspective) did not affect the negative emotions
elicited by selfish offers, but paradoxically decreased the valence
of emotions elicited by the altruistic offer of C5. Questionnaires
FIGURE 3 | Results from questionnaires after Experiment 1 are
presented. Subjective ratings when observing a selfish behavior (A) and an
altruistic behavior (B) indicate that emotion regulation involved specific
emotions. Moreover, subjects experienced large changes in their emotions
when applying the strategies (C), with mentalizing being superior to
distancing.
confirmed this observation, and suggested that the emotion regu-
lated by the strategies was disappointment (higher values) but also
other unpleasant emotions when treated selfishly, and happiness
and surprise when treated altruistically. Interestingly, analyses on
arousal revealed that mentalizing not only increased the valence
of the offers leading recipients to consider them as more positive,
but also increased the arousal associated with them (size effect of
valence of Figure 2). This result may be in apparent contradic-
tion with a previous experiment (Grecucci et al., 2012), in which
authors found that arousal decreased when reappraising IAPS pic-
tures. However, the stimuli used in this other study were very
unpleasant, and even when reappraised they remained quite neg-
ative images, whereas in the DG subjects changed the valence of
selfish proposals, actually considering them as more positive (SAM
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valence ratings were on the positive range, from 5 to 9 points,
except for C1 euro offers).
On the contrary, distancing failed to increase the valence for
negative emotions (elicited by selfish proposals),but also decreased
the valence of positive emotions elicited by altruistic proposals
(offer 5C). In other words, recipients failed to alter the mean-
ing of the proposals. Notably this also affected arousal, but this
time decreasing the strength of emotions (size effect of arousal –
Figure 2), as they were perceived as still unpleasant (contrary to
mentalized trials). Last but not least, the perceived change of emo-
tional strength was stronger when using mentalizing than when
using distancing, indicating that mentalizing is a more powerful
way to regulate one’s emotions.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether emotion regulation
is different when applied in social and non-social situations. Par-
ticipants played the Dictator Game, but with both human (in a
similar fashion to Experiment 1) and computer partners. Partic-
ipants were trained to apply reappraisal when facing human and
computer partners. The strategy was the same (cognitive reinter-
pretation of the event in a way to make it less negative) but with
a focus on the intentions in case of a human partner, and a focus
on situation when the partner was a computer. We predicted both
strategies are effective in altering the emotional experience. How-
ever, we expected a stronger effect for interpersonal regulation
(greater differences between human and computer in reappraisal
condition than in look condition).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four participants (10 males) from the local popula-
tion participated in the study, with a mean age of 22.91 years
(SD± 4.77). The local ethics committee approved the study
and all participants provided written informed consent after the
procedures had been fully explained.
Dictator game
The Dictator Game as described above was used, with the only
difference that a computer image was presented in the computer
condition instead of a face. Participants were told that propos-
als in the computer condition were randomly generated. Again,
each round involved receiving monetary proposals, with each trial
dividing 10C. The offers included four repetitions of five possi-
ble offers (1C, 2C, 3C, 4C, and 5C out of 10C), for 20 offers
for each of the four conditions (Look vs. Reappraisal, Human
vs. Computer), for a total of 80 trials. Type of offers and part-
ners (Computer vs. Human) were completely randomized inside
each block, whereas the strategies were separated into two blocks.
To encourage engagement in the task it was emphasized that they
would be paid a percentage of what they received during the game.
Again participants rated their emotions separately on two scales
(arousal and valence).
Emotion regulation instructions
Before beginning the game, participants were told that they would
use a specific cognitive strategy upon receipt of any offer. A written
protocol describing reappraisal was provided, very similar to that
of Experiment 1, with the exception that the distancing strategy
was omitted and also that examples were given as to how to apply
reappraisal in both contexts (human vs. computer). To apply reap-
praisal to a human partner they were asked to focus on the mind
of the player, building an interpretation of the intentions behind
their behavior. This reinterpretation of their intentions was meant
to be less negative. Some examples were then given (“he is not that
stingy, probably does not have so much money to give me,” “this is
the best he can do”). To apply reappraisal to a computer partner
(non-social regulation) they were asked to focus on the situation,
building an interpretation of the event. This reinterpretation was
meant to be less negative. Some examples were then given (“what
bad luck,” “next time will be better”). Finally, for the “look” con-
dition, they were to simply allow themselves to respond naturally
without any effort of interpretation.
Before beginning the first block of DG, we verified that partic-
ipants understood the respective emotion regulation instructions
by requiring them to verbalize what they would do when con-
fronted with different offers. A practice session proceeded every
block.
Questionnaires
At the conclusion of the experiment,participants were asked to rate
their emotional state when they received the prototypical example
of a very unfair (C1 out of C10), and fair offer (C5 out of C10)
separately for computer and human partners. Moreover, we asked
the strength of perceived emotions when receiving the unfair offer
for all conditions (Human vs. Computer, Look vs. Reappraisal). To
check for differences on perceived effect of reappraisal between the
human and computer partners, at the end of the experiment we
asked for ratings on a 9-point Likert scale as to how much they felt
their emotion change, for both interacting with a human and with
a computer partner. An example of the precise strategies adopted
during the experiment was also recorded for every participant (for
both strategies) after the experiment.
Additionally, participants completed the Interpersonal Reactiv-
ity Index (IRI, Davis, 1980), to test for their ability to take others’
perspective and empathic abilities, and the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (ERQ, Gross and John, 2003) as a measure of the
frequency of reappraisal usage in daily life.
RESULTS
Emotion ratings in the dictator game
We first examined if the affective ratings were different across
regulation strategies. We computed two separate ANOVAs, one
for valence and one for arousal each with reappraisal Strategies
(reappraisal vs. look), Partner (human vs. computer), and Offer
type (1C, 2C, 3C, 4C, and 5C) as factors. Analysis on valence
returned a significant main effect of Strategy [F(1, 23)= 39.724,
p < 0.0001], of Partner [F(4, 84)= 12.363, p < 0.005], and of
Offers [F(4, 92)= 122.299, p < 0.0001], as well as a significant
Partner× Strategy interaction [F(1, 23)= 4.357, p < 0.05], Part-
ners×Offers [F(4, 92)= 2.792, p < 0.05], and Strategy×Offers
[F(4, 92)= 5.390, p < 0.001]. However, the triple interaction
was not significant [F(4, 92)= 0.101, p= 0.982]. Next, we ran
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests with participants’ subjective
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ratings as dependent variables, comparing between human and
computer partner to explore the above 2-way interactions.
Partner× Strategy contrasts were all significant (computer-
look vs. human-look,computer-reappraisal vs. human-reappraisal;
computer-look vs. human-reappraisal, computer-reappraisal vs.
human-look, p < 0.05). Partner×Offer contrast showed signif-
icant effects for 4C, and 5C offers (p < 0.05). Strategy×Offer
contrasts were all significant (look 1C vs. reappraising 1C; look
2C vs. reappraising 2C; look 3C vs. reappraising 3C; look 4C
vs. reappraising 4C; look 5C vs. reappraising 5C). These analy-
ses clarified that the strategies affected the valence ratings in
different ways when interacting with either a human or a com-
puter partner. Reappraisal had a stronger effect for human part-
ners than for computer partners, whereas in the look condition
there was little difference between human partners and computer
partners. Moreover, an effect of specific offers made by human
and computer partners was visible, being fair offers made by
humans perceived as more positive than when made by com-
puters. Last but not least, reappraised offers were rated as more
positive than offers simply attended to (see Figure 4), how-
ever the strongest effect of reappraisal was found for selfish
offers.
Then, we computed ANOVA on arousal that returned a sig-
nificant main effect of Partner [F(4, 84)= 22.275, p < 0.0001],
and of Offer [F(4, 92)= 4.502, p < 0.005], but not of Strategy
[F(1, 23)= 2.714, p= 0.113]. Moreover, there was an interac-
tion between Strategy×Offer [F(4, 92)= 3.617, p < 0.01], but
not of Partner× Strategy [F(1, 23)= 0.141, p= 0.711], nor Part-
ner×Offer [F(4, 92)= 1.835, p= 0.129]. The same applied for
the triple interaction [F(4, 92)= 0.741, p= 0.566]. To explore the
Strategy×Offer interaction, we ran Bonferroni-corrected post hoc
tests on arousal ratings between strategies, for every offer. These
returned a significant difference for the most fair offer (C5:
p < 0.05). In other words, arousal was stronger when the C5 offer
was reappraised rather than when it was simply attended to. See
Figure 5.
To test the hypothesis of a stronger effect of reappraisal in
changing the perceived valence for human as compared to com-
puter offers, we computed the effect size of valence change sep-
arately for each condition. This measure was calculated as the
difference between perceived valence when attending a human vs.
a computer on one hand, and when reappraising a human vs. a
computer on the other. We predict larger differences when apply-
ing the reappraisal strategy than when simply looking at different
partners. While the difference in the look condition between play-
ing with a computer compared with a human was 1.11 points,
the difference between partners in the reappraisal condition was
of 2.53 points, meaning that reappraisal doubled the difference
between playing with a human or with a computer (see Figure 4
and Table 2).
Questionnaires
Subjective ratings when receiving the most fair (C5) and unfair
(C1) offers were entered into an ANOVA for each of the six
FIGURE 4 | Results from Experiment 2 are presented. (Upper part)
Subjects were successful in regulating when both interacting with human and
computer partners. However, reappraisal was stronger for human than
computer partner. Analyses on arousal returned an effect of strategy on
offers, according to which only the altruistic offer C5 was perceived in the
reappraisal condition stronger than the look condition (independently from
partner). (Lower part) Valence change was larger when interacting with human
relative to computer partners.
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FIGURE 5 | Questionnaires after Experiment 2 is presented.
Subjects were more disappointed and disgusted when observing a
selfish behavior (1C offer) from human rather than computer partners
(A). When receiving altruistic offer (5C offer) subjects were happier
when the donator was a human partner (B). Subjects perceived a
change in the strength of emotions when applying the strategies with
both partners. However the human condition showed larger effects (C).
Lastly, a correlation was observed between the ability to take the
perspective of others (IRI questionnaire) and the ability to apply
reappraisal (D).
queried emotions (anger, disgust, surprise, sadness, happiness,
and disappointment) for both human and computer partners.
Analyses returned a significant main effect of Partner [F(1,
23)= 4.385, p < 0.05], of Offer [F(1, 23)= 16.314, p < 0.001],
and of Emotion [F(1, 23)= 24.356, p < 0.0001], as well as
a significant Offer× Emotion interaction [F(5, 115)= 101.034,
p < 0.0001], and the triple interaction [F(5, 115)= 3.856,
p < 0.005].
Next, we ran Fisher-corrected post hoc tests with participants’
subjective ratings as dependent variables to compare between
human and computer partners for each emotion and every offer.
For the selfish unfair offers, disgust, and disappointment elicited
when playing with a human were stronger than when playing
with a computer partner (p < 0.05, respectively: score= 3.54 vs.
2.16, score= 6.2 vs. 5.2). The other emotions were not statistically
significant (all p > 0.05).
For the altruistic fair offers, only happiness was stronger for
human than computer partners (p < 0.05, score= 7.21 vs. 6.41).
The other emotions were not statistically significant (all p > 0.05).
See Figures 5A,B and Table 2. Participants felt their emotions
change more strongly when interacting with a human rather a
computer partner [respectively, 5.04 and 3.95, t (1, 23)=−3.137,
p < 0.005]. See Figure 5C.
Analysis of questionnaires revealed a positive correlation
between the reported frequency of reappraisal usage in daily life
(ERQ-reappraisal subscale) and the ability to take the psycho-
logical point of view of others (IRI-perspective taking subscale;
rho= 0.471, p < 0.01). See Figure 5D.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to test for differences in the regulation
of emotions stemming from interaction with human and non-
human partners respectively. Results indicated that even though
reappraisal can be successfully applied to both contexts, partici-
pants showed a stronger effect on their perceived valence when
playing with a human partner. Therefore, it seems that reap-
praisal leads participants to change the valence of their emotions
to make them more positive for selfish offers, but also stronger
and more vivid for fair offers. Moreover, emotional ratings indi-
cated that on one hand, participants were more disappointed
and disgusted when recipients of selfish behavior from human
rather than computer partners, however when receiving altruistic
offers participants were happier when the Allocator was a human
partner.
Last but not least, there was a positive correlation between
IRI and ERQ questionnaires, indicating that the ability to take
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Table 2 | Experiment 2-results from the experiment and from the questionnaires.
Experiment ratings
Valence ratings
Computer-look Computer-reappraisal Human-look∧ Human-reappraisal∧
C1* 2.11 (1.17) 4.06 (1.41) 2.36 (1.18) 4.55 (1.50)
C2* 3.02 (1.29) 4,77 (1.53) 3.06 (1.35) 5.01 (1.25)
C3* 3.67 (1.19) 5.05 (1.17) 3.94 (1.24) 5.48 (1.48)
C4*§ 4.86 (1.11) 5.77 (1.26) 5.25 (1.22) 6.44 (1.15)
C5*§ 6.26 (1.30) 6.71 (1.51) 6.56 (1.16) 7.39 (1.37)
Arousal ratings
Computer-look Computer-reappraisal Human-look Human-reappraisal
C1 4.60 (2.11) 4.65 (1.79) 5.43 (2.16) 5.76 (1.74)
C2 4.76 (1.69) 4.69 (1.53) 5.07 (1.72) 5.43 (1.80)
C3 4.53 (1.46) 4.94 (1.58) 5.07 (1.68) 5.72 (1.92)
C4 4.55 (1.57) 5.06 (1.77) 5.55 (1.48) 5.69 (1.91)
C5§ 4.97 (1.75) 5.43 (2.01) 5.81 (1.66) 6.14 (2.20)
Questionnaires
Offer 1C Offer 5C
Human Computer Human Computer
Disappointment 6.20 (2.22)** 5.20 (2.37) 1.5 (0.78) 1.5 (1.02)
Anger 4.33 (2.07) 3.95 (2.29) 1.62 (1.34) 1.83 (1.40)
Disgust 3.54 (2.26)** 2.16 (1.85) 1.29 (0.85) 1.25 (0.67)
Sadness 5.16 (1.97) 4.5 (2.53) 1.5 (0.83) 1.66 (0.81)
Surprise 4.04 (2.42) 4.45 (2.35) 6.12 (2.13) 5.5 (2.39)
Happiness 1.75 (1.18) 1.83 (1.01) 7.20 (1.35)** 6.41 (2.18)
*Indicates a significant difference at the level of Strategy×Offer interaction.
∧Indicates a significant difference at the level of Partner×Strategy interaction.
§Indicates a significant difference at the level of Partner×Offer interaction.
**Indicates a significant difference between partners inside every offer.
the psychological point of view of others and emotion regulation
abilities are related. Indeed, the IRI (perspective taking subscale)
addresses one’s tendency to take another’s point of view, akin to
“theory of mind” (Davis, 1983; Frías-Navarro, 2009). This ability
is essential when reappraising the intentions of the other players
(mentalizing).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our ability to regulate emotions when interacting with others is
considered to be a crucial dimension of both emotional intelli-
gence (Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Lopes et al., 2011), and of good
mental health (Gross, 2002; van’tWout et al., 2010). Despite the
extensive literature on emotion “self regulation” (see Ochsner and
Gross, 2008), evidence of emotion regulation in social interactive
situations is still poorly understood. In the present study, we exam-
ined whether emotion regulation strategies can be successfully
applied to socially driven emotions. This is especially impor-
tant when considering that emotion regulation typically occurs
in social contexts (Rottenberg et al., 2005). Previous research has
demonstrated that emotion regulation strategies based on the rein-
terpretation of an event as less negative are powerful tools to allow
us to reduce the subjective experience toward emotional unpleas-
ant pictures. However, few attempts have been made to extend
these findings to the domain of interpersonal emotions. To elicit
these kind of emotions we exposed participants to altruistic and
selfish behaviors while playing the Dictator Game as Recipients
(Kahneman et al., 1986). Prior to both experiments, participants
were trained to apply different forms of reappraisal strategies
(mentalizing vs. distancing in Experiment 1), and toward human
and non-human partners (Experiment 2).
Firstly, our data demonstrate that emotion regulation can be
successfully applied to socially driven emotions. Across both exper-
iments participants reported an increase in valence (that is, less
unpleasant emotions) when reappraising the intentions behind
both selfish and altruistic behavior. More importantly, Experiment
1 showed that not all emotion regulation strategies are equally
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good at altering our emotional responses. While mentalizing-
based reappraisal (defined as the “reinterpretation of the intentions
of the player in a way to make them less negative,” Grecucci et al.,
2012) was effective in increasing the valence of the emotions
experienced, distancing-based reappraisal (“putting oneself in a
detached perspective”) was not. Paradoxically, avoiding emotions
(as a consequence of a distancing strategy), not only failed to
decrease the unpleasantness of experienced emotions when treated
selfishly, but interestingly also decreased the pleasantness of emo-
tions elicited by altruistic behaviors. Because psychiatric disorders
are largely characterized by excessive negative emotions (Werner
and Gross, 2010), this strategy may therefore lead to emotional
disturbance rather than emotional relief.
Experiment 2 tested whether reappraisal can also be used when
the emotion elicited comes from a non-human partner. This is
important to appreciate differences in emotional regulation when
applied to social and non-social contexts. Even though both con-
ditions showed a modulation of emotional valence when receiving
selfish proposals, there was a difference of partner type. Valence
change was stronger when participants regulated their emotions
in response to human offers. In fact, when comparing human and
computer in the baseline condition, this difference was doubled
in the reappraisal condition. Arousal analyses showed interesting
differences in increasing the strength of vividness of experienced
emotions when they were associated with an altruistic behavior.
Both experiments showed interesting results regarding the per-
ception of the strength of the emotional experience, i.e., arousal.
When using reappraisal based on cognitive reinterpretation, both
experiments showed that once unpleasant (and at a lesser extent
also positive) emotions are changed in terms of their valence (per-
ceived as less unpleasant) arousal is increased (evident for C5 offer
in experiment 2), meaning that emotion regulation strategies that
are effective in reframing the events in a more positive way let us
experience our emotions more vividly. In contrast, Experiment 1
showed that distancing-based reappraisal did not change the expe-
rienced emotion (unpleasant emotions in response to selfish offers
are still perceived as unpleasant, and pleasant emotions in response
to fair offers are even less pleasant). One conclusion is therefore
that not all strategies are effective to the same extent in regulating
our emotions. Even though distancing may mitigate individuals’
experience of their emotions by avoiding them, in the long run it
can lead individuals to progressively detach from others and from
situations. This in turn may lead to anhedonia and isolation as
shown by many psychiatric disorders (Leising et al., 2006; Ballon
et al., 2007; Gunderson, 2007). By definition, emotion regulation is
maladaptive “when it does not change the emotional response in the
desired way (e.g., decrease negative affect) or when the long term costs
(decreased work, social functioning, vitality) outweigh the benefits of
short-term changes in emotion (relief, temporary decrease in anxi-
ety)” (cfr. Werner and Gross, 2010). From our results, distancing
may have a temporary relieving effect by decreasing arousal, but at
the cost of not changing or even increasing their unpleasantness.
Psychological studies have shown that cognitive reappraisal is
one of the most flexible and adaptive strategies for regulating neg-
ative emotions (Gross, 2002). The present study confirms previous
findings, but also extends these results into the domain of inter-
personal emotion regulation. In particular, Grecucci et al. (2012)
proposed a variation of reappraisal, called mentalizing-reappraisal
that merges previous work on the importance of building a men-
tal representation of others’ minds (Frith and Frith, 2003), and
its effect on the regulation of the interpreter’s emotional state
(Fonagy, 2006). In practical situations, mentalizing strategies are
commonly implemented in psychological treatment of anxiety
disorders, borderline personality disorders, eating disorders, and
childhood problems (Clarkin et al., 2006; Fonagy, 2006; Bateman
and Fonagy, 2011; Lemma et al., 2011).
The present experiment also extends previous findings on
decision-making. Broadly speaking, emotion regulation strategies
applied to decision-making have one notable advantage as com-
pared to basic emotion regulation studies: they have the opportu-
nity to study complex emotions that cannot be elicited in simple
visual stimuli tasks. Emotions elicited by the outcome of our deci-
sions are of a qualitatively different nature than those experienced
while simply watching disturbing images, and so it was an open
question whether these strategies can be effective in regulating
such emotions and influencing decision behavior in real-life. In
everyday life we are typically confronted with a variety of emo-
tions directly induced by decisions, by the evaluation of risks and
possible losses, and last but not least by social interactions, and
emotion regulation seems particularly useful in such contexts.
Therefore, investigating whether emotion regulation strategies can
have an effect in decision-making contexts has the opportunity to
extend emotion regulation research beyond affective responses to
simple emotional pictures into more complex scenarios. Social
norms, such as fairness, equality, and cooperation, play a fun-
damental role in societies (Deutsch, 1975; Coleman, 1990), with
these norms influencing not only our decisions when balancing
self-interest with others’ interest, but also our perception of the
decisions of others that affect us. Indeed, people tend to select
the most cooperative individuals, and those who contribute less
than others are generally left out of social exchanges (Barclay,
2004; Coricelli et al., 2004; Barclay and Willer, 2007; Cornelis-
sen et al., 2011). Using the Recipient role of the Dictator Game
permits exploration of how we react to social norm violations. In
both experiments we were able to show that when receiving self-
ish offers participants reacted to them with unpleasant emotions,
linearly increasing with the unfairness of the monetary offer. The
detection of violations from social norms (Montague and Lohrenz,
2007) may be of great importance for future interactions with and
eventual punishment of self-interested individuals. This is shown
by the comparison between human and computer partners’ offers,
where fair offers are perceived as more pleasant when the part-
ner was a human, whereas unfair offers elicited more negative
emotions.
On the same line, when reappraising, the identity of the
player matters: we are more prone to “excuse” the selfishness of
a human rather than a non-human donor. The justification of
occasional violations of social norms may be functional in keep-
ing cooperation high between individuals belonging to the same
group.
In recent years, progress in understanding the neural mech-
anisms of emotional regulation has used functional imaging to
identify the neural signatures of regulation (Ochsner and Gross,
2005). The neural bases of different strategies have been outlined,
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as well as how these processes act on target regions responsible for
the specific emotion involved. For example, imaging studies have
shown that reappraisal activates systems appearing to modulate
activity in neural systems associated with emotional responding,
such as the amygdala (Beauregard et al., 2001; Ochsner et al.,
2002, 2004; Levesque et al., 2003; Kalisch et al., 2005; Ochsner
and Gross, 2005; Phan et al., 2005; Urry et al., 2006; Banks
et al., 2007; Kim and Hamann, 2007). However, the role of emo-
tion regulation for socially driven emotions remains quite poorly
explored. Just two studies have explored the neural mechanisms
behind social emotion regulation (Koenigsberg et al., 2011; Gre-
cucci et al., 2012). However, these studies used pictures with social
content but not emotions stemming from real social situations
(Koenigsberg et al., 2011), or the effect of emotion regulation
was observed indirectly (Grecucci et al., 2012). Future experi-
ments based on the paradigm developed in this study can be
fruitfully transferred to neuroimaging experiments to uncover
the brain bases of the regulation of socially driven emotions,
or more importantly try to use physiological measure of emo-
tion regulation such as galvanic skin responses to test for implicit
indexes of emotion regulation abilities. These implicit measures do
not suffer from the expectations participants develop following
the instructions and thus can be more reliable then subjective
ratings.
In conclusion, we investigated the effect of reappraisal based
emotion regulation strategies, and further looked at the effects
of playing with a human or a non-human (computer) partner.
We believe these results are important as they shed light on two
points: the possibility of regulating socially driven emotions on
one hand, and the effect of different strategies themselves on the
other. Our results show that emotional reappraisal specifically
influences emotions stemming from the interaction with altru-
istic and selfish proposers. Both emotions elicited by altruistic
and selfish offers showed an effect of regulation for the two main
dimensions of emotional experience: valence and arousal. These
results extend previous findings on this topic and hold the promise
of shedding light on the understanding of interpersonal problems
shown by psychiatric populations due to poor emotion regulation
(Werner and Gross, 2010).
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APPENDIX
SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE EMOTION REGULATION STRATEGIES
Mentalizing strategy
The way we perceive an event may alter the perception of the event
in a way to make it more or less negative.
See for example the following image:
One interpretation can be that this woman is suffering because
of the death of a beloved one. Another interpretation is that she
is simply tired. Both are plausible interpretations, but the effect
of these instructions may be different. The first increases the per-
ceived negativity of the event, the second decreases it. We are asking
you to make an effort of reinterpretation of the event in a way to
decrease its negativity. . .
Can you generate another example of how to reinterpret that
picture as less negative?. . .
Now we will teach you how to apply this strategy to the domain
of the Dictator Game.
In the following part of the experiment you are asked to rein-
terpret the intentions of your partner in a way to consider them as
less negative. . .
Subjects were given some examples on how to apply this
strategy to DG:
“You can think that this person has no money to give you,”
“He/she is in troubles,” “In another situation he/she may be more
generous”
Distancing strategy
Another useful strategy that people can use to decrease the
negativity of an event, is to take the distance from it.
See for example the following image:
Such a situation is undoubtedly unpleasant. However, the fact
that we are more or less involved in this situation determines how
negative we perceive that situation. Someone can think that this
situation has great relevance for himself/herself and perceive it as
very negative. Someone else may in turn think it does not affect
his/her life.
These two ways of thinking, in touch or detached from the
situation, alter the way we perceive that situation. . .
Can you generate another example of how to think in a
detached way that picture?. . .
Now we will teach you how to apply this strategy to the domain
of the Dictator Game.
When asked to apply such a strategy you should put yourself in
a detached perspective and think that this situation is not relevant
for you.
Subjects were then given some examples on how to apply this
strategy to DG:
“This offer won’t affect your economic situation,” “I don’t care
of your money,”“I don’t even know you”
Baseline “look” condition
Look at the offers and make your response in a spontaneous way
without applying any strategy.
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